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Science as a Democratic Life-





1 I’d like to start with a truism: Science is a crucial factor in the functioning of modern
national states, of the tightly connected web of global economy and of the emerging
world society. The current global crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic offers ample
proof for this fact: without the transportation-technology driven by science, the virus
would never have had the chance to spread as quickly as it actually did, but without
science we would also be completely lost and helpless pertaining to how we should
cope with the situation. Nevertheless, we are used to consider the science-system as
something largely driven by its own, internal logic of inquiry and connected with the
rest of society mainly via two constitutive relations, one input- and one output-related:
political institutions regulate the cash-flow providing science with the means for its
investigations  (e.g.  the  development  of  a  vaccination),  whereas  the  technological
output of science continues to transform economy and everyday life (e.g. the pandemic
will likely soon be over once a vaccination will be accessible for large parts of the global
population). 
2 As a rough and vastly oversimplified sketch, the input-output model surely contains
some truths, but it leaves crucial questions unanswered. Is science dependent upon the
specific  form  of  political  government  and  social  division  of  labor  in  which  it  is
embedded? Does it presuppose political freedom and the division of powers? Or is its
internal logic compatible with different political systems? The fact that e.g. research in
A.I. or genetics flourishes in nondemocratic societies such as China seems to provide
evidence that the latter is the case. But it has also been argued that it is, at least in the
long run, true that the principles of inquiry operative within science are internally
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connected  with  the  free  exchange  of  opinions  and  the  possibility  of  uninhibitedly
articulating dissent which are associated with democratic societies. John Dewey is the
most  vigorous  proponent  of  this  idea.  Strongly  opposed  to  dualisms  and  rigid
separations as he was, Dewey emphasized the structural similarity between ordinary
experience with its egalitarian and collaborative form on the one hand and scientific
rationality  on  the  other.  Furthermore,  he  identified  democracy  with  organized
intelligence and saw a strong internal connection between the scientific spirit and the
values keeping democracy alive: “[T]he spiritual basis of democracy,” Dewey wrote in
1903, is “the efficacy and responsibility of freed intelligence” (Dewey 1903/2008: 236)
and “the methods pursued by the scientific inquirer [,] give us an exact and concrete
exhibition of  the path which intelligence takes when working most  efficiently  […]”
(ibid.: 239). More precisely, he believed that “the specific cognitive virtues of science
[…]  –  free  inquiry, toleration  of  diverse  opinion,  and  free  communication  –  were
necessary if not sufficient attributes of a democratic society and polity” (Westbrook
1991: 170). Hilary and Ruth Anna Putnam have recently argued much in the same line,
following Dewey, and have underlined that both science and democracy presuppose the
values  of  open  communication  and  a  fallibilistic  attitude  (Putnam  &  Putnam  2017:
433-5).
 
2. Science, (Communication) Technology, and
Democracy
3 But even if we bracket the question about the existence of internal relations between
democracy and science it remains a truism that modern societies are shaped by science
and science-driven technology in every imaginable manner. It is a safe bet that the
likely  progress  of  artificial  intelligence  during  the  next  decades  will deepen  this
influence in a hitherto unprecedented degree. But while it  is  evident that scientific
progress  has  in  many  cases  accompanied  and  also  facilitated  the  development  of
democratic  societies,  we  have  neither  evidence  from history  nor  any  metaphysical
guarantees  for  a  pre-established  harmony  between  the  two.  Steven  Pinker,  in  his
exceedingly optimistic book Enlightenment Now – The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism,
and  Progress (Pinker  2018,  esp.  199-213)  depicts  the  ideals  mentioned  in  his  book’s
subtitle and the rise of democracy as inextricably bound together, but even he would
probably be more cautious in the light of last year’s developments. And pertaining to
the  ideal  of  democratic  participation  and  social  equality,  the  seemingly  inevitable
intrusion of AI and other technological developments into the infrastructure of human
interaction raises deep and disturbing questions. To name only one: when the social
life-world in which democratic values are developed and shared becomes more and
more impregnated with activities enabled by information technology in the first place,
the algorithms running on the necessary devices and networks will increasingly impact
democratic  procedures  and  facilitate  manipulation.  In  Dewey’s  own  account  of
democracy, face to face-communication takes precedence.1 But almost a century ago it
was completely impossible to foresee the degree in which social exchange would be
changed by the internet and the quasi-monopolist companies shaping its form. The
driving forces behind these developments are completely out of democratic control, as
for example the election campaign of 2016 in the U.S. has shown. It is for these and
many other reasons that VR-pioneer Jaron Lanier, already in 2006 in an article titled
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“Beware the online collective” and elsewhere, expressed deep concerns about what he
calls the “global flood of anonymous mob-like commentary” (Lanier 2006) and other
distortions of democratic communication.
4 Couched in more general terms, these threats to democracy belong to the problem of
the interplay between social values, scientific inquiry and technological developments.
For  pragmatist  philosophers,  science  and  technology  are  important,  but  neither
independent  nor  privileged  components  of  the  social  life-process,  the  interactional
cycle  between  social  organisms  and  their  environments.  Increasing  democratic
participation and enabling personal and communal growth are, according to Dewey,
human values to which science and technology should be subordinated. As he writes in
his last book, lost and then recently found again, the problem of (scientific) knowledge,
“in  its  widest  and deepest  sense  is  a  moral  problem,  understanding by  ‘moral’  the
question of human values as far as they are capable of being forwarded and expanded,
retarded and frustrated,  by  deliberate  human conduct”  (Dewey 2012:  112).  Modern
pragmatist philosophers of science, most notably Philip Kitcher, have taken up these
themes and underlined the  value-entanglements  of  science  as  well  as  the  need for
democratic  control.  According  to  Kitcher,  a  well-ordered  science  would  treat
knowledge as a public good (Kitcher 2011: 241), and not leave the course of inquiry and
technological  developments to be determined by the interests  of  profit-makers and
affluent  societies,  as  it  continues  to  happen  today  for  example  in  disease  and
vaccination  research.  Well-ordered  science  would  make  room  for  the  quest  for
knowledge as an end in itself, a consummative experience, but it would give primacy to
the pursuit of humane values embedded within society’s life-process and shaped by
non-scientific social experiences. Achieving such a normative understanding of science
is  of  the utmost  importance for any emphatic  vision of  democracy,  since it  is  only
scientific inquiry that provides us with the means to effectively manipulate nature in
the service of moral values in Dewey’s sense. 
5 Yet even Kitcher’s sensitive account has a hard time coping with the tension between
what one could call the internal democracy of educated experts within scientific inquiry
and the inclusive democracy of all citizens within a society, educated or not. Hostility
against  scientific  research  and  its  results,  so  wide-spread  in  contemporary
democracies, will not disappear even if the citizen juries Kitcher suggests (“small but
representative  groups  of  citizens  being  tutored  in  particular  aspects  of  scientific
research and then deliberating with one another about what courses of action would be
most beneficial for all,” Kitcher 2011: 233) would be a well-established feature of all
democracies.  The  success  of  science  depends  upon  adherence  to  the  principle  of
selecting and educating cognitive  elites  whereas  the success  of  democracy depends
upon  broad  participation  irrespective  of  cognitive  capacities  and  education.  This
inevitable tension is enlarged by a public dimension of science to which – as far as I can
see – Kitcher pays no special attention: its influence on comprehensive worldviews.
 
3. Science, Scientism and the Problem of Worldviews
6 Comprehensive  worldviews,  in  the  form  of  both  religions  and  secular  attitudes  or
doctrines, are important factors in the functioning of modern societies. Naturally, the
impact of those worldviews has changed massively in late modernity with large-scale
processes like religious individualization, pluralization, and secularization. But the fact
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that the dominance of a single religion and its social-integrative function characteristic
for traditional societies has in modern democracies been replaced by a multitude of
diverging  religious  and  secular  options  has  not  diminished  the  impact  of  those
comprehensive attitudes. As William James has argued forcefully, human beings tend to
strife for a certain degree of unity among their manifold relationships to the world, a
unity  often  experienced  in  an  emotional  manner  and  only  ex  post articulated  in
comprehensive worldviews.2 The “philosophy” (the word used in a very large and non-
technical  sense)  of  a  person,  James holds,  “is  only  partly  got  from books:  it  is  our
individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos”
(James 1907/1981: 7). Nowadays, due to the omnipresence of science and science-driven
technology  in  modern  life,  many  people,  including  many  scientists,  tend  to  invest
science  with  the  authority  to  speak  the  last  word  in  matters  of  comprehensive
worldviews. Yet, as I have tried to show elsewhere (Jung 2019), worldviews deal with
reality from the viewpoint of its – comprehensive and final – meaning, which inevitably
introduces the engaged perspective of the first person. If any given worldview is to
satisfy  minimal  conditions  of  rationality,  factual  and  causal  knowledge  have  to  be
respected – a condition that quickly rules out any religious fundamentalism. But it will
always  contribute  only  necessary,  never  satisfying  conditions.  Nevertheless,
contemporary  public  discourse  is  characterized  by  many  deep-seated  confusions
pertaining to  the  relation between science  and worldviews,  and the  probably  most
tenacious one is called by the name of scientism.
7 Here we have another side of the mutual entanglement of science and social values, one
which has not yet received much attention, but still plays an important, ever-growing,
and often detrimental role in modern societies,  namely the problematic inflation of
science  to  a  generalized world-view.  Unfortunately,  the  term scientism suffers  from
many excessively vague uses and sometimes indeed shrinks to what Steven Pinker has
called a mere “boo-word” (Pinker 2013). This can happen for example when proponents
of the humanities use it to discredit the claims of natural scientists to expand the scope
of  their  research  into  areas  hitherto  reserved  for  the  hermeneutic  disciplines.
Nevertheless, if used with the necessary precision and care, the charge of scientism
seems to me to address an actual, important, and ever-growing problem pertaining to
the relation of science to the social life-process. Scientism, I propose, can be diagnosed
validly,  whenever  scientific  knowledge  is  inflated  beyond  its  legitimate  borders  to
include value-questions and especially a generalized understanding of reality as such.
Two misunderstandings have to be avoided here: firstly, it is of course not in the least
scientistic to strife for compatibility with scientific knowledge as far as one’s worldview
is concerned. To the contrary,  doing so is  a presupposition of any rational attitude
towards reality in general. Rejecting scientism is very different from rejecting science,
and it is a major shortcoming of Pinker’s contribution to The New Republic mentioned
above that he fails to make this distinction. Secondly, there also is nothing wrong with
trying to base a comprehensive worldview on science.  This worldview, though,  will
then  inevitably  have  to  extrapolate  scientific  knowledge  and  integrate  value-
assumptions as well as emotional attitudes, and will thus, admittedly or not, have to
open  the  door  for  non-scientific  modes  of  experience.  John  Dewey’s  naturalistic
humanism, based not only on science but also on non-epistemic modes of experience
like art and morals, is a case in point.
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8 What is  so  bad about  scientism,  especially  when it  comes to  the flourishing of  the
democratic life? Scientism disables us to see the crucial  importance of  what Dewey
called “the qualitative” for democracy, that is the basic fact that “the world in which
we immediately live,3 that in which we strive, succeed and are defeated is preeminently
a qualitative world. What we act for, suffer, and enjoy are things in their qualitative
determinations.”  (Dewey  1930/2008:  243).  Abstracting  from  the  first-personal,
qualitative  involvement  with  reality  is  constitutive  for  science  but  detrimental  for
democratic  life  since it  makes invisible  what people actually  care about.4 Scientism
reduces the manifold of human forms of experience to a single form, namely science,
taken to be exclusively truth-revealing and getting us in touch with reality with a big R.
Theory reduction, when taking place within science, is an important part of scientific
methodology.  But it  should not be confused with the reduction of  non-scientific  to
scientific experience. When science alone is taken to be the arbiter of the existence of
everything, then interpersonal,  aesthetic,  religious, moral,  practical etc.  experiences
are  inevitably  reduced  to  an  epiphenomenal  status  and  a  fatal,  anti-democratic
dichotomy between the scientifically enlightened few and the large majority of  the
uneducated dwellers in Plato’s cave is created. 
9 It is, for example, a direct consequence of neuro-constructivist positions like Thomas
Metzinger’s, that ordinary people are confined to the mental illusion of reality their
brains produce for them whereas only the neuro-philosopher is able to break through
to what actually counts ontologically: the brain and its workings. “As a matter of fact,
we are ourselves systems which constantly ‘confuse’ themselves with the subsymbolic
self-model they have created. In doing so, we create a stable and coherent ‘self-illusion’
which  we  are  unable  to  transcendent  on  the  level  of  our  conscious  experience.”
(Metzinger 1998:  361;  my translation).  But,  luckily for the scientists,  Metzinger also
claims:  “On  the  level  of  theory-building,  we  are  able  to  break  through  our  naive-
realistic self-understanding.” (Ibid.:  365;  my translation).  If  this two-tiered structure
were true, it would be very bad news for anyone still concerned with the democratic
ideal of communication among equals as the basis for social life. The vast majority of
people  would  be  lost  in  an  evolutionary  useful  illusion,  whereas  only  cognitive
scientists would be able to actually get in touch with reality – albeit only as scientists,
not  in  their  everyday  life  as  partners,  mothers  or  fathers,  citizens,  voters  etc.
Illusionary subjects, endowed by morality and law with illusionary dignity, would be
the quicksand on which democratic discourse would be built upon.
10 Neuro-constructivism  is  among  the  most  radical  forms  of  scientism,  but  its  softer
versions are no less disturbing for any meaningful conception of democracy, given the
fact that any open society will contain citizens with many different takes on religious
and  worldview-questions.  Devaluating  their  deepest  convictions  as  inherently
irrational  is  one  of  the  most  effective  discussion-blockers  imaginable.  Take,  for
example, Steven Pinker once again. He contends that “the worldview that guides the
moral and spiritual values of an educated person today is the worldview given to us by
science” (Pinker 2013). This implies that e.g. Christians, Jews, or Muslims, since their
moral and spiritual values are not drawn from science, do not belong to the realm of
educated  people  and  are  therefore  severely  handicapped  regarding  their  ability  to
participate in democratic discussions. But even for adherents of worldview naturalism,
the idea of science as giving us moral and even spiritual guidance makes no sense.
Commitment  to  an  ontology  for  which  reality  is  coextensive  with  the  findings  of
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science does not suffice to produce a full-fledged worldview. One still has to integrate
e.g.  moral  and  aesthetic  values,  something  which  presupposes  leaving  the  neutral
scientific attitude and adopting the stance of human beings having to live a life and
caring about it. To claim that the scientific stance in itself already contains moral and
other values to live by in one’s everyday life runs straight against the methodological
constraints  of  science.  Furthermore,  and apart  from the  question of  values,  Pinker
seems to be convinced that science delivers more than fallible, but often very reliable
truth, namely an understanding of the world gradually approaching totality. Instead of
demanding compatibility with science,  something which is  crucial  for  all  liberal  and
enlightened versions of  religions and worldviews,  he identifies  the scientific  stance
with a  comprehensive picture of  reality.  This  excludes not  only all  sorts  of  religious
attitudes, even what Kitcher calls refined religions,5 strictly speaking it even eliminates
secular humanism. This world-view attitude, wide-spread among scientists as it may be,
can evidently not be based upon science alone. The scientific stance, albeit imbedded
into values developed in ordinary experience and to a large degree motivated by the
desire to understand and control nature in accordance with these values, is constituted
by the bracketing of our ordinary, value- and interest-driven point of view. Therefore,
as argued above,  the aesthetic,  evaluative and normative dimensions of  e.g.  secular
humanism  can  never  be  derived  from  science.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  a  scientific
worldview, only science-compatible and incompatible worldviews.
11 Like  it  or  not,  world-views  and  religions,  that  is  comprehensive  attitudes  towards
reality in general, play an important role in shaping the attitudes of the members of
democratic communities. I take this to be an empirical truth which is hard to deny, and
it should be kept clearly distinct from the very different claim, made prominent by
Richard Rorty (1989), that the contingency of all cultural artefacts effectively destroys
the possibility of comprehensive attitudes which include truth-claims. Even someone
who argues that the world would be a better place if people refrained from generalized
religious or secular attitudes towards life and the world must admit that in the world as
it actually is such attitudes continue to exert their influence. Among the pragmatist
philosophers it was William James who pointed out time and again how deeply human
conduct  is  shaped  by  “a  man’s  total  reaction  upon  life”  (James  1902/1990:  39).
According to James, we cannot avoid at least to live an answer to the question “What is
the character of this universe in which we dwell?” (ibid.). James also insisted that quite
often, anti-religious attitudes are akin to religious ones in the importance they gain for
the identity of the respective persons: “[…] the more fervent opponents of Christian
doctrine  have  often  enough  shown  a  temper  which,  psychologically  considered,  is
indistinguishable from religious zeal.” (Ibid.). This statement from 1902 can easily be
applied  to  contemporary  writers  like  Richard  Dawkins,  Sam  Harris,  Christopher
Hitchens and Daniel Dennett. Relaxed ironists à la Rorty are different of course; but
even they, albeit rejecting any cognitive generalization, are characterized by a certain
unifying attitude towards life in general.
12 The  next  step  must  now  be  to  connect  James’s  anthropological  insight  into  the
importance of attitudes towards life with Dewey’s emphatic – and anti-individualistic –
understanding of democracy as a form of life. In his Democracy and Education, Dewey
underlines that “democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode
of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience” (Dewey 1916/1985: 93). And
he relates this  ideal  directly to the diversity of  interests,  attitudes and experiences
human beings exhibit: “more numerous and more varied points of contact denote a
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greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual has to respond.” (Ibid.). The goal is a
“widening of the area of shared concerns, and the liberation of a greater diversity of
personal capacities which characterize a democracy” (ibid.).  Dewey himself does not
relate  his  ideals  of  “shared  concerns”  and  “greater  diversity”  to  the  varieties  of
worldviews, and his own handling of worldview pluralism is hampered by his quasi-
religious  faith  in  democracy.6 But  given  the  empirical  reality  of  an  irreducible
multitude of comprehensive attitudes and doctrines, it seems important not to exclude
them from the emphatic concept of democratic conversation which Dewey sees as the
hallmark of democracy as a form of life. If scientism would acquire a hegemonic status
in public discourse, the deepest convictions human beings hold and the values they
cherish most would (with the exception of scientistic humanists) be excluded from the
public  realm.7 To  be  sure,  the  problem  of  worldview-hegemony  holds  for  any
comprehensive  doctrine,  especially  for  religious  ones.  Worldview-  and  religious
pluralism is the most demanding and difficult case of “shared common interest,” and
always endangered by withdrawals of the respective communities into their internal
communal life, or even worse, by aggressive or even violent attacks on dissenters. 
13 The pluralism Dewey has in mind exhibits two distinct features: it acknowledges the
historical  and  biographical  contingencies  of  human  experience  as  intrinsically
valuable,  and it  also  makes  room for  the variety  of  different  aspects of  experience.
Human beings differ in their perception and articulation of comparable experiential
qualities, and they also differ as to the irreducible multitude of modes of experience.
Both features are denied when science is extrapolated into a comprehensive worldview
without the acknowledgment that by doing so one enters the realm of first-personal,
non-scientific  experience.  It  is  the  lack  of  this  acknowledgement  that  constitutes
scientism, not the fact that someone tries to extrapolate a worldview from science. 
14 Since at the heart of scientism lies the rejection of non-scientific modes of experience,
it cannot do without a deep social division between scientists and, bluntly put, the rest.
Hence, the political correlate of scientism is not democracy, but an expertocracy or
technocracy,8 in which the relevance of diverse modes of experience is rejected, and
along with it the normative ideal of equality. The neuroscientist David Eagleman, to
provide  just  one  example,  sees  science  as  effectively  deconstructing  the  ideal  of
equality, which he takes to be a pre-(neuro-)scientific myth (Eagleman 2012, chap. 6).
His scientistic inference (the term “naturalistic fallacy” would be more appropriate)
goes from the factual  unequality of  human brains – which are without further ado
taken to be standing for the human person in toto – to the normative obsoleteness of
equality. Thus, for him only experts, or more precisely neuroscientists, are competent
to make the right decisions. “My dream,” Eagleman tells his readers, “is to build an
evidence based, neurally compatible social policy instead of one based on shifting and
provably  bad  intuitions”  (Eagleman  2012:  192).  From  this  angle,  the  Universal
Declaration of Human Rights probably counts as one of those shifting intuitions, since
it is definitely not based on reflection upon the workings of the human brain. Eagleman
leaves no doubt that the necessary evidence for social policies can only be provided by
neuroscientists, whereas the “provably bad intuitions” come from scientific laypeople.
Democratic  deliberations  encompassing  all  citizens  are  entirely  left  out  of  his
scientistic picture.
15 Eagleman’s  dream  is  Dewey’s  worst  nightmare.  The  pragmatist  philosopher  has
developed convincing arguments against any contraposition of experts and the masses.
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Mark B.  Brown  sums  them  up  succinctly  in  three  points:  “First,  if  the  masses  are
incompetent, as technocrats assume, they will not accept rule by experts. Second, ‘in
the absence of an articulate voice on the part of the masses,’ experts will become ‘a
specialized class’ that is ‘shut off from knowledge of the needs which they are supposed
to serve.’ […] Finally, Dewey argues that if experts isolate themselves from society, they
become ‘a class with private interests and private knowledge.’ Government by experts
is nothing but ‘an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few’.” (Brown 2009: 149f.).9
Scientism  provides  the  worldview-background  for  technocratic/expertocratic
conceptions like the one propagated by Eagleman. It is therefore crucial to expose its
anti-democratic implications as clearly as possible.
 
4. The Alternative to Scientism: Pragmatist and
Democratic Pluralism
16 In this section, I want to argue that the philosophers of classical pragmatism, especially
John Dewey, have developed the conceptual means to avoid scientism, to embrace the
actual varieties of human experience and also to make room for world-view pluralism,
albeit with the crucial and very demanding constraint that the respective world-views
and  religions  must  be  willing  to  participate  in  the  democratic  process. When  the
question concerning the relation between science and democracy is raised, showing
how  scientific  expertise  and  democratic  decision-making  can  be  brought  into  a
mutually enhancing arrangement is only one part of the problem. It is also necessary to
counter  what  Habermas  called  the  colonization  of  the  life-world,  that  is  the  self-
alienation of democratic communities, in this case caused by the intrusion of scientistic
self-descriptions and exaggerated expectations addressed to technology. The diverse
trans- and posthumanistic movements offer a glimpse of what may happen in the long
run when scientism succeeds. Often, they are entangled with influential proponents of
the digital  industry  and of  AI-research like  Ray Kurzweil  or  Anthony Levandowski.
These  movements  differ  widely  from  each  other,  but  they  all  incline  towards  an
empowerment of technological elites as opposed to Dewey’s vision of the inclusion of as
many forms and as many subjects of human experience as possible.
17 The argument I want to develop now depends upon Dewey’s conception as articulated
in  his  books  Experience  and  Nature  (1925/2008)  and  Logic.  The  Theory  of  Inquiry
(1938/2008). Already in Experience and Nature, Dewey leaves no doubt that he a.) sees a
decisive  difference  between  ordinary  and  scientific  experience,  b.)  holds  that  this
difference pertains to different functions within the human life process and has no
ontological implications and c.) rejects the “assumption of the identity of objects of
knowledge and ultimately real objects” (Dewey 1925/2008: 26), that is the ontological
basis  for  scientism.  Scientific  experience  focuses  upon  relations  between  events
conceived  of  as  independent  from  what  human  beings  care  about,10 whereas  in
ordinary experience reality appears within the engaged mode of interaction with the
social and physical environment. Both forms of experience are fallible and in need of
reflective improvement, but both may reveal actual features of the natural world. In his
late  opus  magnum,  the  Logic,  Dewey  expands  this  general  stance  to  the  idea  that
“scientific  subject-matter  is  intermediate,  not  final and  complete  in  itself”  (Dewey
1938/2008: 72). Its partial autonomy stems from the fact that we have to bracket our
human values and desires if we are to understand the workings of nature and thus to
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gain  causally  effective  knowledge.  But  this  bracketing  is  something  transitory,  a
necessary but not sufficient stage in human experience and action. Therefore, scientific
knowledge is able to rectify ordinary experience with regard to systematic relations
existing between events and objects (the paradigmatic example being the explanation
of the experience of the rising sun through the earth’s rotation), but it has to be re-
integrated  into ordinary  experience  to  give  us  the  full  picture.  Aesthetic,  moral,
religious,11 etc., ways of experiencing also disclose facets of reality, facets inaccessible
from the detached standpoint of methodological experience. 
18 There  exists  an  inner  affinity  between  this  Deweyan  emphasis  on  the  irreducible
multitude of human experience and his ideal of democracy as inclusive and uninhibited
communication.  The  ideal  of  a  democratic  form  of  life  calls  for  a  wide  and  non-
scientistic understanding of experience. In a science-driven globalized world-economy,
democracies are in desperate need of scientific expertise, yet a hegemony of scientistic
worldviews (as distinct from the flourishing of science and its societal impact) would
dry  out  the  sources  of  pluralist  democratic  discourse.  The  main  constraint  for  the
proponents  of  religious  worldviews  is  that  with  regard  to  those  features  of  reality
accessible by the sciences their authority has to be respected. Evolution-deniers, racists
and  proponents  of  verbally  inspired  holy  scriptures,  to  give  a  few  examples,  have
discredited  themselves  by  disrespecting  science.  In  broad  strokes,  this  is  what  is
implied  in  Dewey’s  general  picture.  I  would  like  to  add  that  scientism is  not  only
detrimental  for  democracy  but  also  a  form  of  disrespecting  science,  even  if  it  is
propagated by scientists and science journalists. When, for example, Edward Wilson in
his book Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge claims that “People need a sacred narrative”
and suggests to take it from “the true evolutionary epic, retold as poetry” (Wilson 1999:
289), science has degenerated into pseudo-religion.12 
19 As I have already pointed out, there is absolutely no realistic prospect that in the near
future secular  world-views and religions will  lose their  importance and yield to  an
experimental,  piecemeal  attitude  abstaining  from  generalizing  to  comprehensive
images of reality. That being the case, we’d better come up with a viable concept of how
to integrate this manner of transcending the empirically given into our ideas of the
democratic form of life. Getting the appropriate status of science within democratic
societies  right  is  an  important  part  of  this  concept.  The  first  part  of  the  problem,
namely the quest for better integrating social values with the course of inquiry and
technological  development,  has gigantic dimensions and its  solution is  considerably
aggravated by the dominance of economic interests. But the theoretical groundwork
has, despite some shortcomings I see, already been delivered by Kitcher’s pioneering
work and especially his ideas about “the evolution of public knowledge” and “public
reason” (chap. 4 and 6 of Kitcher 2011).  The second part challenges us in ways not
foreseeable from the viewpoint of the first. Pragmatist meliorism has to a.) integrate
the lasting influence of religions and comprehensive world-views into its vision of the
democratic way of life, and b.) develop criteria for assessing the proper role of science
in this regard. 
20 As to the first point, the pragmatist idea of an unreducible pluralism of experiences and
their articulations, even on the highest level of comprehensive worldviews, raises the
awareness for their contingency and counters the anti-democratic, regressive hope for
integrating whole societies via a single overarching set of final values. But at the same
time,  it  encourages  democratic  societies  to  foster  all  forms  of  dialogue  and  open
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conversation about values in the hope that what John Rawls called an “overlapping
consensus”  might  be  achieved –  a  consensus  about  a  just  society  “affirmed by  the
opposing religious, philosophical and moral doctrines likely to thrive over generations”
(Rawls 1987: 1). Rawls was definitely no pragmatist, but his acknowledgment of deep-
rooted worldview-pluralism as an inevitable social fact connects him with the classical
pragmatist’s insight into the “varieties of experience,” to paraphrase William James. 
21 Roberto Frega (2012), drawing on Rawls’s concept of the burdens of judgment, has tackled
the problem of irreducible pluralism in modern societies in a helpful manner. As he
argues, disagreements in terms of moral and worldview-questions have to be accepted
as being not only reasonable (that is, due to empirical constraints we cannot overcome)
but also rational (Frega 2012: 137). This being so, the question is how to integrate them
into what Frega calls a “wide view of democracy.” His book from 2019 bearing that title
contains a wealth of suggestions how democratic procedures, institutions and publics
should be developed in accordance with the pragmatic spirit of pluralism and fallibility.
Frega’s  “democratic  experimentalism”  highlights  the  tension  between  ordinary
experience  and  expert  knowledge,  but  it  remains  largely  silent  about  the  role  of
worldviews and religions within this context. It should, however, be possible to expand
his approach in the direction of taking both science and religions seriously. The crucial
point is this: If rational, not only reasonable disagreements are accepted as inevitably
pertaining to comprehensive worldviews, and the reflective among their adherents are
willing to accept that, religious traditions of sensemaking are insofar – at least partly –
released from being encapsulated in closed communities.  They become available  as
contributions  to  an  ongoing  democratic  exchange  about  values  and  meanings.
Naturally, religious believers will not regard their experiences and convictions as being
exhausted by their contribution to a pluralistic, experimental conversation about the
common good. But they will be able to participate in this conversation without being
forced to entirely bracket their most deep-seated attitudes. Similarly, the contributions
of scientists to the value-laden questions of social life will more likely be accepted as
important if articulated without the Pinkerian ideological pretense of expressing the
only possible rational worldview. 
22 This leads us to the second point: two opposite, but closely related misconceptions of
science’s  relations  to  world-views  and  religions  have  to  be  avoided  to  enable
“democratic experimentalism.” Unsurprisingly, the first is the fundamentalist idea that
from the standpoint of a given worldview or religion science should be limited to what
is compatible with the mindset of the respective attitude. The proponents of scientism
would definitely agree. But scientism, the idea that science is not only a necessary but
also the only and sufficient source of world-view orientation, is almost as detrimental to
the  flourishing  of  democracies  as  religious  fundamentalism.  If  we  discard  both
attitudes, as appropriate, we have to embrace a limited version of world-view pluralism
as a permanent condition of the democratic form of life, broadly in the same manner as
the late John Rawls saw well-ordered societies as shaped by the overlapping consensus
mentioned above. The scientific understanding of human beings, life in general and the
universe contributes immensely to any non-fundamentalist world-view or religion, but
it doesn’t single out a specific one, because these generalized stances are to a large
degree always shaped by non-methodic, personally engaged forms of experience. And it
cannot be different since the raison d’être of worldviews is orientation for actors and
their quest of having to lead a life. Dewey’s theory of comprehensive experience and
the non-final, albeit crucial role of science within it enables us to see why this is the
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case,  why  democratic  pluralism  includes  those  generalized  attitudes,  and  why  we
should reject scientism as vehemently as all forms of religious fundamentalism.
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NOTES
1. “I am inclined to believe that the heart and final guarantee of democracy is in free gatherings
of neighbors on the street corner to discuss back and forth what is read in uncensored news of
the day […].” (Dewey 1939/2008: 227).
2. For a comprehensive treatment of this complex issue, see my Science, Humanism, and Religion.
The Quest for Orientation (Jung 2019).
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3. Note that this statement includes scientists, too. Whenever not acting in their professional
role, they live their lives in qualitatively determined situations (actually, pragmatist philosophy
of science suggests that even scientific inquiry cannot do without a qualitative sensibility to the
importance vs. irrelevance of theories and experimental results).
4. In his paper “John Dewey and the Importance of the ‘Qualitative’  for Democracy” (Pappas
2015)  Gregory F.  Pappas  argues  very  convincingly  that  taking  the  qualitative  seriously  must
include careful attention to its contemporary distortions brought about e.g. by mass media: “The
dangerous aspects of rhetoric and emotional persuasion are more significant today than during
Dewey’s time. The people are swayed by irrelevancy, amusement, and fear. They are seduced by
images, propaganda, and demagoguery instead of by the force of argument.” However, according
to  Pappas  the  solution  to  this  lamentable  predicament  cannot  be  to  bracket  the  qualitative
dimension  of  human experience,  but  rather  to  restore  it  to  its  proper  function.  Democratic
deliberation requires rigorous argument and critique, but it becomes cut off from the interests
and values social conflicts are about if not guided by qualitative sensitivity.
5. According to Kitcher, religions are “refined” when religious truths are not put in the same
category as questions of factual truth or falsehood (cf. Kitcher 2014: 88). Roughly, the contrast
pertains between fundamentalist and refined religions.
6. See his A Common Faith (Dewey 1934/2006) and my critical assessment of his own confusion
between methodological naturalism and worldview-naturalism: Jung (2016). 
7. The problem is obviously related to the much debated question about Aristotelian and Kantian
conceptions of the relation between the right and the good. Pragmatists find themselves more on
the Aristotelian side and probably most of them would agree with Michael Sandel: “Many of the
most hotly contested issues of justice and rights can’t be debated without taking up controversial
moral and religious questions. In deciding how to define the rights and duties of citizens, it’s not
always possible to set aside competing conceptions of the good life. And even when it’s possible,
it may not be desirable.” (Sandel 2010: 243).
8. It should be obvious that to reject expertocracy is very different from rejecting the importance
of experts. Without competent experts, no democracy could survive, as the current corona-crisis
shows very clearly.  But the most  self-reflective among those experts,  like in the case of  the
German virologist Christian Drosten, again and again alert the public to the fact that virological
expertise is not the same thing as political decision-making and taking action.
9. The  quotes  within  the  quote  are  taken  from  Dewey’s  The  Public  and  its  Problems (Dewey
1927/2008).
10. This claim may sound strange when made by a pragmatist, since pragmatists conceive of
science  not  as  the  freestanding  and  disinterested  search  for  knowledge  but  as  a  human
enterprise  driven  by  our  desire  to  understand and control  nature  in  the  interest  of  human
values. Yet in order to achieve this, Dewey emphasizes, we have to methodically abstract from
the first-personal  perspective.  As  Francis  Bacon has  pointed out  already in  early  modernity,
“natura non nisi parendo vincitur” (Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed).
11. Dewey has contributed substantial work to each of these adverbial dimensions of experience:
Cf. his Ethics (Dewey 1932/2008), Art as Experience (Dewey 1934/1989), and his Terry Lectures A
Common Faith (Dewey 1934/2006).
12. For a critical account of evolution-based scientistic approaches see Mary Midgley’s Evolution
as a Religion (Midgley 2010).
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ABSTRACTS
Science is among the most crucial factors for the functioning of modern democracies, yet we
tend to conceive of the science-system as mainly driven by its own internal logic and connected
with  the  rest  of  society  via  input-output-relations.  But  does  that  mean  that  science  is
independent from the political system and the cultural life-form into which it is embedded, or is
science intrinsically related to democracy? While authors like Hilary Putnam and Philip Kitcher
have already tackled these questions, an important part of the problem has hitherto been largely
neglected:  how is  science related to  the worldviews one may justifiably  hold in a  pluralistic
society? Arguing with Dewey’s emphasis on the irreducible multitude of human experience, the
paper  defends  a  conception  of  wide  “democratic  experimentalism”  (Frega),  in  which
compatibility with science is crucial for the rational acceptability of worldviews and religions,
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